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MASS TORTS AND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS
John A. Silicianot
In tort circles, it passes as something close to gospel truth that
mass torts present a special case. They are widely viewed as creating
crisis conditions within the tort system that call for radical and innovative reforms. Hence, the debate among academics, lawyers, and
judges has focussed almost exclusively on which one of the proposed
remedies-ranging from modifying procedural rules' to reordering
the priority of claimants2 to removing such cases from the tort system
altogether 3-is best suited to meet the threat posed by mass torts.
Most recently, this crisis rhetoric has been invoked to justify perhaps
the most radical and controversial of all such reforms, the settlement
class action.
This Article eschews the endgame debate about remedies and instead asks a more preliminary question: is the nearly universal perception of crisis really justified?4 In answering this question, this Article
takes a purposely narrow perspective. It is conceded that large numbers of any kind of claim-be they RICO suits or disability appeals or
diversity cases-can burden the courts and thereby invite procedural
innovation. It is also conceded that the collective treatment of large
numbers of cases involving large amounts of money may pose special
ethical dilemmas for the attorneys and judges involved. These are issues of judicial administration and professional responsibility, upon
which tort scholars have no particular claim to expertise.
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. BA. Cornell 1975; M.PA. Princeton 1979;
J.D. Columbia 1979.
1 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A ProposedFederal
ProcedureAct 64 Tax. L. REv. 1039 (1986).
2 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: DeferralRegistries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Tria The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation,98
YALE. L.J. 813 (1989) (reviewing PETER ScHuCK,AGENT ORANGE ON TRiAL: MASS Toxic
DIsASTERs IN THE COURT (1987)).
4 The crisis metaphor has infected almost all writing on the subject of mass torts. For
a very partial sampling, see Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A MultiBillion-DollarCrisis, 30 HARv.J. ON Lacis. 383 (1993); David Rosenberg, The CausalConnection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REa. 849
(1984); Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and LitigationDisasters,20 GA. L. Ray. 429 (1986);Jack B.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.469 (1994); Jack B.
Weinstein & Eileen Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv.
269; Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983);
Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation (1991) [hereinafter Judicial Conf. Rpt.].
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Rather, the question of interest from the tort perspective is
whether such claims, because of either their substance or their size,
tend to create conditions of pathology within the tort system. This
Article first considers the substantive nature of such cases as tort claims,
in contrast to any other kind of case that might, in sufficient numbers,
create administrative challenges for the courts or ethical dilemmas for
the bar. Put differently, how much of the prevailing apocalyptic attitude towards mass torts is appropriately attributable to their nature as
torts as opposed to their simple mass?
After suggesting that mass torts present few interesting or novel
questions of doctrine or substance, this Article next considers whether
the size of some mass tort actions alone may make the whole something considerably worse than the sum of its parts. Specifically, are
the frequently catalogued symptoms of crisis-long delays, high transaction costs, defendant bankruptcies, and unpaid claimants-really
signs of size-related pathology? To the contrary, this Article concludes
that such conditions will naturally and inevitably arise when any liability-based system of injury compensation confronts large numbers of
similar cases.
Because such conditions are not pathologies but instead are inherent in the nature of the torts process, this Article suggests that
most crisis-based reform efforts are asking the wrong question. Rather
than attempting to identify and correct what has gone wrong with the
tort system, a more fruitful inquiry would ask whether we should abandon tort law altogether as a means for compensating the victims of
mass torts. Crisis rhetoric impairs our ability to think constructively
about this general question and instead invites chaotic and haphazard
reforms. This Article concludes by considering whether asbestos litigation represents an exception to the not-so-special problem of mass
torts.
I
WHAT ROUGH BEAST SLOUCHES

TowARDs

BETHLEHEM?

The assumption implicit in much of the literature on mass torts is
that they differ, in some fundamental respect, from the "everyday"
cases that the common law was designed to handle. Thus, their impact on the tort system has been labelled "unprecedented,"5 "bizarre," 6 and "pathological."7 And not only are mass torts new and
bad, but they are mutating into even more dangerous forms: we now
5
6
7

Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 4, at 270.
Rubin, sura note 4, at 450.
Edley & Weiler, supra note 4, at 395.
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have not simply mass torts to contend with, but "monstrous mega-mass
torts."

8

Yet are mass torts really a different animal, one capable of creating a crisis for tort law? In most salient respects, the answer would
almost certainly have to be no. As a threshold matter, mass torts feature rather pedestrian fact patterns. 9 Airline crashes and oil spills are
dramatic lessons on the perils of mechanized transportation, but the
underlying story is completely familiar and always the same: something breaks or somebody goofs. Asbestos, Agent Orange, DES, the
Dalkon Shield, breast implants, and heart valves are, in the end, simply manifestations of our age-old talent as a species for finding new
ways to poison or otherwise injure ourselves in the name of progress.
Nor do such cases often raise challenging issues that stretch the
boundaries of our rules of liability or damages. 10 Their familiar fact
patterns easily fit within the traditional forms of action for negligence,
strict liability, or products liability. Mass torts generally do not depend on the acceptance of novel theories of recovery, such as liability
for pure emotional harm or consequential economic loss," but rather
concern the kinds of physical injuries that have traditionally been the
focus of tort law.
At best, the substantive nature of mass torts is noteworthy in that
some cases raise interesting and thorny issues of causation. 12 This is
particularly true with respect to cases such as those involving asbestos,
Agent Orange, and DES, where the claims of injury are based on exposure to carcinogenic or otherwise harmful substances. In such
cases, complicated and diverse patterns of exposure, multiple actors
introducing the same substance into the environment, possible interactions with other causal agents, and fundamental uncertainties re8 Weinstein, supra note 4, at 568.
9 Some commentators have recognized their familiar nature. See Linda S. Mullenix,
Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: ParadigmMisplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 579, 581 (1994)
(characterizing mass torts as "garden variety tort[s]").
10 This is not to suggest that such boundaries are necessarily correct as currently configured or that courts never err in the application of such rules. Courts on occasion commit both kinds of mistakes-adopting overly expansive liability rules or misapplying sound
rules in a given context. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. Either kind of error
can cause special problems in the mass tort context, simply because of the number of cases
involved. The point, then, is not that mass torts are immune from such problems, but that
because mass torts litigation draws both its doctrine and its process from the mainstream of
tort law, it does not present a special or unique risk of doctrinal or process-related error.
11 In some instances, however, courts have allowed claims for unrealized or intangible
harms to proceed. This has contributed substantially to the size of some mass tort litigations. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. However, such decisions are not restricted to the mass tort context, but instead can also occur in traditional single-plaintiff
cases. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (negligently inflicted emotional distress).
12 See Rosenberg, supra note 4.
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garding the etiology of the claimed harms often work together to
cloud the basic issue of causation.' 3
When the recoveries of large numbers of plaintiffs are at stake, it
is tempting to escape these causation conundrums by easing or ignoring wholesale the traditional requirements of proof. There may be
circumstances in which it may be appropriate to give in to this temptation-to cut a global deal between large numbers of plaintiffs with
tenuous causation claims and groups of defendants who might be better off in the long run paying such plaintiffs to go away. The disposition in the Agent Orange case has elements of this kind of horse
14
trading.
But whether or not such resolutions ultimately serve the ends of
tort law-a question to which we will return' 5-it is still important to
realize that the difficulty of the causation issues in such cases has nothing to do with their "unique" nature as mass torts claims. Rather, such
causation problems typically stem from the inherent difficulty of reconstructing events in the distant past, the perennial problem of separating multiple causal influences, and the general limits of scientific
knowledge. These same difficulties in proof can present themselves in
single-plaintiff, one-of-a-kind cases as well. 16 This observation is not
meant to minimize the problem that causal indeterminacy poses for
tort law, 17 but only to emphasize that this problem is not restricted to
the multiple plaintiff context. The only thing "unique" about causation issues in mass tort cases is that the sheer number of claims makes
more visible to the naked eye the common-and commonplaceweaknesses such cases share with respect to the issue of causation.' 8
At this point in the literature of crisis, one often senses a "where
there's lots of smoke, there must be some fire" argument regarding
the causal indeterminacy problems raised by mass torts. David Rosenberg, for example, argues that there is a difference in the nature of
causal uncertainty depending upon the number of claimants involved:
The preponderance rule may be adequate for the set of sporadic
accident cases in which causal indeterminacy arises randomly and
13 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 3, at 820 ("As long as scientific understanding of the
toxicity of various synthetic products remains so rudimentary, the existing frontiers of
knowledge provide virtually no guidance on the incidence and magnitude of harm from
new chemical products; and, as a resultjudges andjuries have almost unlimited discretion
in determining causation.").
14 Id. at 816.
15 See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
16
See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2dl (Cal. 1948); Smith v. Rapid Transit Inc., 58
N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
17 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). See generally Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-FactRules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982).
18 See Rosenberg, sura note 4, at 858.
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always signifies a substantial chance that the defendant in fact
harmed no one. But the rule is neither a rational nor a just means
of resolving the systematic causal indeterminacy presented by mass
exposure cases involving defendants whose tortious conduct has
caused or will cause a statistically ascertainable increase in the incidence of a particular disease.' 9
This is an interesting point, but if anything, it indicates that some causation issues actually become easier in the mass tort case. In separate
"sporadic accident cases," weak evidence on causation is invariably fatal even though we know as a statistical matter that some such causation hypotheses must in fact be true. In the mass tort context, the
same failure of proof problem can occur at the level of individual
claims, but at the aggregate level one may observe statistically significant proof of generic causation by virtue of the large numbers involved. It may be a good idea to do something creative with this
information, as Rosenberg suggests, but that opportunity exists because of, rather than in spite of, the nature of mass torts causation
issues.
Indeed, to a significant extent, the perception that mass torts
cases present "special" problems of causation may arise not from the
cases themselves, but from the threshold decision to view them as
mass torts. The asbestos cases, for example, if treated as a single, undifferentiated "mass tort," present truly insolvable issues of causation.
But the difficulty is in substantial part the result of the decision to
lump all such claims together. The case of a nonsmoking shipyard
worker with years of direct exposure to asbestos dust who has developed the signature injury of mesothelioma presents a much different
causation picture than a claim based on asymptomatic pleural thickenings in the lungs of a life-long smoker who had only occasional,
non-occupational exposure to asbestos.2 0 When we consider the cases
independently, it quickly becomes clear that one plaintiff has a relatively strong case on causation, while the other does not.
Thus, the "insolvable" causation issues in some mass torts cases
actually become easier to resolve when such cases are dis-aggregated
instead of collectivized. The "monster" of asbestos is a prime candidate for such taming.2 1 Of course, this process will reveal hopelessly
inadequate proof of causation in some sub-classes of mass torts claims,
their survival to date having depended on their parasitic attachment
to stronger claims. But the demise of such claims, once isolated from
the host body, is not a problem peculiar to mass torts. Indeed, it is
not a problem at all, but instead is a natural outcome in any system of
19

Id.

20
21

See Schuck, suPra note 2, at 545-50.
See infra part IV.
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civil liability that is keyed to the question of defendant responsibility
rather than plaintiff need and that insists on a certain quantum of
proof to establish that responsibility.
This point deserves reiteration. A painful but unavoidable consequence of requiring a plaintiff to bear the burden of proving the defendant's responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence is that
recovery will be denied in some situations where causation-as a
purely factual matter-probably exists despite our present inability to
prove it. If there is a hint of unfairness, 22 it inheres in the process of
proof applicable to all civil litigation; it is not some dysfunction peculiar to mass torts, or even to tort law in general. 23 We as a society may
ultimately determine that the problem of uncompensated plaintiffs is
so serious that we should abandon our traditional focus on determining responsibility and instead get busy paying anyone with a vaguely
colorable claim of injury. Such a decision essentially entails replacing
the tort system with a comprehensive mechanism of social insurance. 24 If we are going to make such a bold move, we should do so
openly and honestly.2 We should admit forthrightly that we are abandoning tort law, not because it cannot "handle" the problem of causation in mass torts, but rather because it does handle the problem, but
in a manner that no longer suits our mood.
In sum, if mass torts really are something new and different, their
novelty is not readily apparent in the nature of the injuries, claims, or
legal issues involved. In these respects, they bear a very familiar face.
The case for special treatment, if it can be made, therefore must rest
primarily on the argument that the sheer number of such claims
causes fundamental distortions within the tort system. We now turn to
that question.
II
DOES SIZE MATTER?

Most of the literature of crisis begins with a recitation of the large
numbers of individual claims that make up mass tort cases. 2 6 The
standard incantation that asbestos-related claims number over 100,000
and are still growingis frequently asserted as if that bare fact should end
22

This "unfairness," of course, is offset by a reciprocal risk that defendants bear

under a preponderance of evidence standard that causation will be found to exist in situations where it is absent as a matter of fact.
23 See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasionin a World of Imperfect Knowledg 60 N.Y.U. L.REv. 385 (1985).
24 See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
25 Some commentators have recognized that the "problem" of mass torts is really a
general question about the tort system's general approach to accident compensation. See,
e.g., Rabin, supra note 3, at 829.
26 See, e.g., Edley & Weiler, supra note 4, at 383; Rubin, supra note 4, at 430.
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all quibbling about the existence of a crisis demanding bold measures.
But it probably pays to quibble, at least a little bit, when what hangs in
the balance is a wholesale restructuring of common law institutions.
Specifically, it is important to develop some more refined understanding of why and when size matters.
In searching for such an understanding, it is also important to
guard against confusing a crisis that demands reforms with an opportunity that merely invites efforts to increase adjudicative efficiency.
The desire to kill many birds with one stone is natural and is certain to
arise whenever large numbers of cases share some factual or legal issues. Itfeels wasteful and redundant to relitigate the same basic questions, time and again, when through some collective process we could
resolve them once and for all. But this view, standing alone, does not
justify the claims of crisis, unless we are simply talking about a crisis of
tedium. 27 A real crisis requires a showing of pathology, of breakdown,
of desperate times that justify desperate measures.
Put differently, it is one thing to say that we could obtain some
useful savings through various reforms, but another to say that the tort
system must embrace such reforms or face imminent collapse. The
first position is merely an observation of opportunity; the second is a
claim of crisis. Now, exploring opportunities is not necessarily a bad
thing. Other considerations aside, improving the efficiency of the tort
system is a positive move. The problem is that we cannot so easily set
other considerations aside: the values of collective resolution come at
a cost to other concerns that are also central to a fair system of litigation. These concerns include not only the amorphous entitlement to
one's "day in court," but also the practical violence that can be done
to non-common issues of fact and law when they are herded into a
28
common pasture.
This is not to say that collectivizing is impermissible, but only that
it does not inevitably produce a net gain. Rather, the goal is to strike a
sensible balance between the benefits and costs of collective resolution. Indeed, many features of our existing system of civil litigation
are explicitly aimed at achieving such a balance. Procedural rules directed towards joinder, consolidation, and issue preclusion all seek to
increase adjudicative efficiency. Most notably, the federal class action,
which authorizes class actions in cases where common issues of law
27 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 4, at 328 (arguing that appellate courts should be
more willing to approve class action certification of mass tort cases in order to "do a better
job of relieving judges of litigation 're-runs' for those who face a series of identical pending
cases").

28 See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 69; Roger H. Trangsrud, JoinderAltematives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. R-v.
779 (1985); see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Optimal Issue Separation in Modem Products

Liability Litigation,-

TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
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and fact predominate over non-common issues, 29 explicitly attempts
to optimize the costs and benefits of collective resolution. Indeed,
some mass tort cases meet this standard and quickly fade from view.30
It is with respect to those that don't go away that the itch of opportunity still lingers.
Scratching that itch can be dangerous. If, at bottom, the calls to
reform the tort system are driven by the simple desire for enhanced
adjudicative efficiency, several thorny questions ought be confronted.
First, in the absence of a true crisis, why should the seemingly sensible
balance represented by Rule 23 and similar procedural devices be
redrawn? Unless we are confronting a systemic emergency that requires some form of legal triage, it is hard to justify tilting this equilibrium radically in the direction of collective adjudication. Moreover, if
we are bent upon extracting more savings, why do it from mass torts,
or from the tort system at all? Why not pick on diversity actions or
prisoner suits or penny ante drug prosecutions? It seems a rather
wooden position to conclude that simply because a certain kind of
claim is becoming more numerous, the rules for resolving that category of claim require streamlining. There is no ceiling on the percentage of tort claims within the total docket, anymore than there is a
quota for criminal cases. Efficiency-based reform, if it is to be principled, ought to cast a wide net.
Perhaps because of the difficulties of advancing a pure efficiencybased justification for major reforms in the mass torts area, most efforts are grounded in a perception that the sheer number of claims in
such cases creates a bona fide crisis for the tort system itself. Put differently, the case for treating mass torts differently is usually premised
on the belief that the tort system, while efficient in handling one-onone litigation, seriously malfunctions when it attempts to resolve mass

29 FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). With respect to mass tort actions, the Advisory Committee
Note to the 1966 Revision of Rule 23(b) (3) (39 F.R.D. 69, 103) observed:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability,
would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
Consistent with this view, class action certification has been rejected in a number of mass
tort actions. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.) (asbestos), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 852 and 479 U.S. 915 (1986); In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d
300 (6th Cir. 1984) (Bendectin claims); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (Dalkon Shield), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171

(1983).

30 Or at least they should. They continue to be catalogued in the literature of crisis,
seemingly in an effort to demonstrate the size of "the mass tort problem." For a general
discussion of the use of class actions in the mass torts context, see Mullenix, supra note 1.
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tort cases.3 1 Among the warning signs of this alleged crisis, four enjoy
consistent prominence as horsemen of the apocalypse.
First, it is argued, the congestion resulting from mass tort claims
causes intolerable delays in these cases and caseloads in general.3 2 Second, resolution of such cases involves unacceptably high transactioncosts,
with claimants often recovering only thirty to forty cents per dollar of
the total amount expended in litigation.3 3 Third, mass tort cases, if
handled by the tort system, can easily result in the bankruptcy of defendants.3 4 Finally, and in part because of such bankruptcies, late-arriving
claimants face the prospect of inadequate damage awards because
compensationfunds are exhausted.35 These contentions are considered
separately.
A.

Intolerable Delays

Mass tort litigation inevitably contributes to the congestion and
delay in the civil litigation system. For example, it takes an average of
thirty-one months to dispose of an asbestos claim in the federal
courts-almost twice the time required in a typical civil claim. 36 The
degree of delay may pose severe financial problems for claimants who
face uncovered medical expenses in the interim. Moreover, the large
number of mass tort claims in the courts imposes significant collateral
costs on other cases in the docket.
The observation that mass tort claims increase courtroom congestion and delay, however, does not prove the existence of a problem,
let alone one massive enough to require revamping or even discarding the tort system.3 7 In fact, the delays may be normal, and the congestion may in some ways be beneficial.
How can delay be normal? Well, except in the world of television
fiction, delay is the norm rather than the exception; all adjudicatory
31
See, e.g.,Jack B. Weinstein, A Newfrom theJudiciary, 13 CARDozo L. R~a. 1957, 1957
(1992) ("The tort system works fairly well in individual cases.... It does not work well with
mega-mass tort cases."); Weinstein & Hershenov, supranote 4, at 276 ("Mass tort cases have

outstripped the ability of the common law, with its relatively rigid adherence to precedent,
to fashion remedies that adequately redress the harms of modem technological society.").
32 See, e.g., Judicial Conf. Rpt., supra note 4, at 10-11.

33

See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 2, at 554-55.
See, e.g., Edley & Weiler, supra note 4, at 391.
See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 4, at 436.
See, e.g., Judicial Conf. Rpt., supra note 4, at 10-11.
The delay and congestion argument falls within a broader genre bemoaning the socalled "litigation explosion." See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LiABILrr. THE LEGAL REVOLUTION
AND rrs CONSEQUENCES 9-10 (1988); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 694-95 (1987). The rhetoric of crisis
adopted by such sources is not born out by available data. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day
After the LitigationExplosion, 46 MD. L Rav. 3, 7-16 (1986);James A. Henderson,Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change,
37 UCL.A L. REv. 479 (1990).
34
35
36
37
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processes are time-consuming. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
sets eighteen months as an aspirationaltarget for the processing of an
average civil case.38 It should hardly be surprising that many mass tort

cases exceed this benchmark. As the proponents of major reform are
fond of noting, mass tort cases are often considerably more complicated than the average civil suit. They often involve multiple parties
and complex issues of responsibility and causation. Thus, even under
optimal adjudicative conditions, such cases will take longer to resolve
accurately and fairly than do simpler cases.

In short, the argument of intolerable delay fails because it lacks
an objective benchmark. How long should a complex tort case take in
a crowded and constrained judicial system? Two and one-half years is
no sprint, but it isn't Bleak House either. In between the poles of in-

stant resolution and interminable litigation, the answer is relative, not
absolute. The argument of intolerable delay presupposes that there is

another, faster way to address complex issues in our crowded adjudicative system. But none of the proposed reforms has produced such a
contender. Instead, they attempt to improve adjudicative efficiency by
jettisoning important procedural or substantive features of the tort
system. Yet lightening the load in this manner invalidates precisely
the kind of comparative inquiry necessary to establish intolerable
delay.
One might attempt to rejuvenate the delay argument with reference to the difficulties plaintiffs can suffer as a result of long delays.
Again, however, this problem is hardly unique to mass torts, or even to
tort law in general; all plaintiffs suffer this risk as a consequence of the
law's decision to make compensation contingent upon a determination of liability. Although the resulting hardships are more painful to
observe in the tort context than elsewhere, such hardships are more
accurately attributable to the inadequacies of our social insurance and
health care systems than to any crisis within tort law.
To continue with this heretical line of reasoning, not only may
the delays in mass tort cases be normal, but the resulting congestion
of court dockets may be beneficial, or at least not worth doing anything dramatic about. First, it pays to note that the large surges of
injuries characteristic of mass tort cases are not generated by the tort
system and thus are not responsive to tort reform. Rather, such widespread harm is inevitable in a society that accepts a "play now, pay
later" philosophy toward the use of new and potentially hazardous
products. Tort reform may displace these surges into some other system of injury compensation, but the big numbers will not go away.

38

28 U.S.C. § 478(a) (2) (B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Moreover, there is substantial doubt that the problem of courtroom congestion can be significantly improved. The underlying thesis of the congestion argument seems to be that if mass tort cases were
resolved collectively or removed from the courts, dockets would return to a tranquil, uncongested state. This is fantasy, and of an unhealthy sort. As has been argued convincingly elsewhere,3 9 judicial
caseloads tend towards an equilibrium that naturally entails a fair degree of congestion. This occurs because potential claimants typically
factor delay-related costs into their decisions to bring suit. Uncrowded dockets act like a litigation vacuum, drawing marginal claims
into the courts, while highly congested dockets suppress the incentive
to sue. Thus, condensing or removing mass tort cases may have little
long-term impact on courtroom congestion, and may have the shortrun cost of providing room for less meritorious claims to sprout.40 If
we clear the courtroom, more will come, and we may not like them
any better.
B.

Unacceptably High Transaction Costs

Although firm figures are hard to come by, it seems clear that
successful plaintiffs receive less than half of each mass tort litigation
dollar.4 ' The greater portion pays for plaintiffs' and defendants' attorney's fees, the cost of hiring experts, and related litigation expenses. Almost without exception, the proponents of comprehensive
tort reform characterize these "transaction costs" as "extraordinarily
high" 42 and "unconscionable." 43
This transaction cost argument suffers from the same threshold
deficiency as the delay argument Except in the abstract world of
Coasean forms, 44 transaction costs permeate legal institutions and
decisionmaking. Pronouncing such costs "too high" begs the question, "compared to what?'" Unless we believe that we can simply intuit
the issue-that we know excessive transaction costs when we see
them-it is necessary to agree upon a controlling benchmark.
39 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal ProcedureandJudicial Administration, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400-10, 445-48 (1973); George L Priest, PrivateLitigants and
the Court Congestion Probem, 69 B.U. L REv. 527, 533-44 (1989).
40
Priest, supranote 39, at 557 (noting that "the parties' litigation decisions will serve
to offset the effects of congestion reform. Indeed, the more effective a particular reform,
the greater the offsetting response, as parties choose to litigate rather than settle their
disputes").
41

DBoRAH HENSLER, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

20 (1992); JAMES S. KAKAUK & NICHOLAs M. PACE, COSTS & COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 74 (1986).
42
Schuck, supra note 2, at 554.
43 Judicial Conf. Rpt., supra note 4, at 13; see also Schuck, supra note 2, at 554.
44
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (hypothesizing
transactions incurring no costs for information, negotiation, and execution).
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Unfortunately, such agreement is hard to come by. Many commentators on the mass tort problem avoid or simply fail to grasp the
unavoidably comparative nature of the inquiry. Those that do generally suggest that transaction costs in the mass tort area are too high
when compared to alternative systems for compensating accident vic4
tims, such as no-fault insurance or workers compensation schemes. 5
Yet, such comparisons are inherently unfair. To be sure, compensation is a goal, or at least a salutary by-product, of the tort system, but it
is inaccurate to characterize tort law solely as an accident compensation scheme. It is much more than that.
Specifically, tort law serves both the noninstrumental end of corrective justice and the instrumental goal of deterring socially wasteful
activities. 46 Both efforts depend on a particularized and nuanced determination of defendant responsibility. This determination, which is
played out in the often thorny questions of fault and causation, can be
costly. In some areas, we as a society have decided that the game is
not worth the candle, and have created simpler schemes more keyed
to compensation of injured parties and less driven by the question of
responsibility. 47 Such schemes have lower transaction costs because
they aspire to far less. We may ultimately follow this path with respect
to mass torts, concluding that it no longer pays to inquire whether the
defendant did anything wrong or even whether the defendant's actions caused the harm for which compensation is sought. But such a
change, if it is to be made, demands a clear understanding of the
broader trade-offs at stake, and should not be simply a visceral and
uncalibrated reaction to the costs of adjudicating mass torts.
If pure compensation schemes do not represent a good benchmark for assessing the level of transaction costs in mass tort cases, then
what does? Presumably, the best benchmark would be tort cases in
general, or at least other forms of civil litigation where fault and causation play key roles. Good data in this area are generally lacking, but
some arm-chair calculations may be revealing. Under the contingency
fee arrangement in an "ordinary" tort case, a successful plaintiff receives about two-thirds of the judgment, with the plaintiff's attorney
receiving the remaining one-third. The defendant's litigation costs, including attorney's fees, should correspond roughly to those of the
plaintiff. Even in a simple case, then, the transaction costs incurred in
compensating the plaintiff begin to approximate the amount of compensation received and therefore substantially exceed those gener45
See, e.g., Schuck, supranote 2, at 554 n.52 (suggesting that appropriate comparison
is with "almost any alternative compensation system that one can imagine, including some
that, mutatis mutandis, are already in place").
46 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. Ex AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 28-32 (4th ed. 1994).
47 See Rabin, supra note 3, at 827-28. See generally infra part I.
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ated by pure compensation schemes. When the added complexity of
mass tort claims is factored in, the cost of adjudication naturally increases, so that the figures in the mass tort area become less
surprising.
As an empirical matter, then, the case for excessive transaction
costs is far easier to assert than to prove. But the doomsayers' contentions also have a normative cast: such costs are bad not only because
they are too big, but also because they shortchange worthy claimants
"while attorneys and experts prosper."48 The insinuation here-that
mass tort litigation squanders resources by making gratuitous welfare
payments to a privileged and parasitic group-may carry a nice rhetorical sting, but it is ultimately without substance. Absent an argument that the markets for legal and expert services are inefficient,
presumably these payments are for something of real value to the
plaintiffs and defendants that make them.
Indeed, we need not even presume what that value might be, for
it is clear. Mass tort cases raise important and often complex issues
relating to responsibility and causation, issues which are only resolved
through the services of lawyers and experts. Advocates of broad reforms cannot have it both ways. They cannot argue that mass torts
involve "serious political and sociological issues" that affect "the
health and.., security of many individuals and the viability of major
economic institutions,"4 9 while characterizing the costs entailed in
resolving those issues as "simply deadweight losses, pure social waste
50
that imposes costs with few offsetting benefits."
C.

Bankrupt Defendants

Perhaps the strangest argument in the literature of crisis, at least
when it issues from the mouths of tort scholars, is the concern repeatedly expressed over the potential of mass tort cases to bankrupt corporate defendants. If one subscribes at all to the dominant view that tort
law's primary instrumental function is to encourage actors to make
socially optimal investments in safety, then occasional bankruptcies
should be expected and even welcomed. This is because the encouragement tort law offers to actors to behave reasonably comes not in
the nature of a polite request, but in the harsher form of liability judgments indicating that the actor has failed to act appropriately.5 1 If an
Edley & Weiler, supra note 4, at 396.
Weinstein, supra note 4, at 474, 476.
50 Schuck, supra note 2, at 555.
51 SeeJohn A. Siliciano, CorporateBehavior and the SocialEfficiency of Tort Law, 85 MicH.
L REv. 1820, 1825 (1987). This is true even in products liability cases that involve alleged
flaws in the design, testing, and marketing of products. Although these claims, which constitute the majority of products liability cases, are handled under a "strict" liability regime,
the determination of defectiveness inevitably requires a negligence-type reasonableness in48

49
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actor makes too many such mistakes, just as if it habitually overspends
on labor or energy or some other cost of business, insolvency naturally
follows. Thus, it simply does not play to cast companies that suffer
tort-related bankruptcies as the noble martyrs of an unjust tort system. 52 In reality, they are chronically careless actors that have caused
more harm than they can pay for. One need not view bankruptcy as
their just desert in a retributive sense to see that it is an appropriate
disposition simply as a matter of both necessary deterrence and simple
accounting.
Of course, unwarranted bankruptcies can occur if the tort system
consistently overstates defendant liability. Such errors may arise in a
variety of ways. For example, aberrant and expansive judicial approaches to the question of fault can hold defendants liable for harms
that they could not reasonably foresee. 53 Moreover, punitive damage
awards in separate cases against a single defendant for the same general conduct can act as a form of civil "double jeopardy," resulting in
excessive aggregate damages relative to the wrongdoing at issue.5 Finally, judges and juries may err in applying legal rules in a way that
systematically favors plaintiffs, thus overtaxing defendants with
55
liability.
Regardless of the abstract plausibility of such concerns, there is
no reason to believe that the liabilities of now-bankrupt mass tort defendants were overstated. First, despite the conventional belief in a
"liability explosion," the best evidence indicates that as a matter of
both doctrine and practice the trend in tort cases decidedly favors
defendants. 56 Moreover, in light of the numbers of claims involved, it
seems implausible that the insolvencies that have occurred could have
been avoided under even the most favorable pro-defendant conditions imaginable. Finally, the claim of pathology in the literature is
not even based on the actual occurrence of unwarrantedbankruptcies,
but instead arises from the mere prospect of any bankruptcy among
quiry. See RESTATEMENT (THID) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY §2 cmt. c (Council Draft

No. 2, Sept. 1994).
52 See, e.g., Edley & Weiler, supra note 4, at 391.
53 See, e.g., Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (asbestos
producer legally responsible for dangers that were not discoverable at time of production).
The aberrant approach in Beshada has been rejected by other courts. See, e.g., Feldman v.
Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (NJ. 1984).
54 See Griffin B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U.
Rics. L. REv. 1 (1987);Jason S. Johnston, PunitiveLiability: A New Paradigmof Eficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLuM. L Rgv. 1385 (1987).
55 See genera/!yJamesA. Henderson, Jr., Judical Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
56 See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in

Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992); Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 37;
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Commentary, Stargazing: The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332 (1991).
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mass tort defendants. As noted above, however, this squeamishness
about bankruptcy is inappropriate in light of the critical role it plays
in eliminating actors who chronically generate excessive levels of risk.
Nor is it a sufficient rebuttal to cite the impact defendant bankruptcies have on "larger communities than those encompassed by the
litigants before the court,"5 7 including "the workers, pensioners, and
communities that rely on the economic viability of the defendant businesses."5 8 This sentiment-and that is all it is-is seriously misplaced.
First, the collateral impact of bankruptcy is not particular to the mass
torts context; this concern can be advanced against any bankruptcy.
Second, the ongoing "economic viability" of such defendants is an illusion; such companies are already dead by their own hand, and the
precipitation of bankruptcy merely confirms this sorry fact. In this
context, the prevailing imagery-in which "monstrous" mass tort actions "cause" bankruptcies that threaten the future of "pensioners"is all wrong. Rather, it is the repeated, unreasonable, and harmful
actions of defendants that generate overwhelming liabilities, which
the defendants themselves then seek to manage and adjust by taking
shelter in the bankruptcy laws.
Finally, and most importantly, if we are to worry about the "larger
communities" affected by the potential bankruptcy of a mass tort defendant, both the best and the only legitimate place to do such worrying is in the context of bankruptcy itself. Bankruptcy is not the
seventh ring of Hell, but instead is a powerful, comprehensive, and
flexible device for determining in a broad and equitable sense
whether all the constituencies with a stake in the bankrupt enterprise
are better off with the company dead than alive. If continued "economic viability" serves this broader community, Chapter 11 provides
the legally authorized mechanism for such redemption. 59 In this regard, tort claimants have no more interest than any other stakeholder
in precipitating the liquidation of a defendant; they will typically do so
only if the company is so economically feeble that liquidation is the
60
only sensible alternative.
Not only is the fear of bankruptcy misplaced, but the attempt to
circumvent it through judicially-initiated systemic reforms raises seri57

Weinstein, suPranote 4, at 474.

58

Edley & Weiler, supranote 4, at 396.

See generally Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalln Shield Claimants Trust: ParadigmLost (or
Found)?, 61 FoRDHsM L. R=v. 617 (1992) (discussing success of the A.H. Robins/Dalkon
Shield reorganization).
60 See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving MatureMass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L REv. 659,
677-78 (1989) (noting that bankruptcy claimants "are united by a common interest in maximizing returns from a fixed asset base that diminishes over time. Each party owns a common resource and, since neither party can act unilaterally, the parties must agree on how
to share that resource").
59
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ous questions of legitimacy. It is fine for tort claimants and defendants to agree voluntarily to readjust liabilities to avoid an incipient
bankruptcy, but it is altogether different for a crusading court to coerce such an arrangement to protect "public interest" from such an
outcome. In the latter case, Congress has already defined a comprehensive scheme for the mandatory reorganization of liabilities. If this
legislative device is functioning poorly, then legislative amendment is
the appropriate solution, not ad hoc common law substitutes. To the
61
extent that mass tort litigation is truly "akin to public litigations,"
that public law is to be found in the Bankruptcy Code. 62 Paradoxically, then, it is the unnatural fear of bankruptcy that pervades the
literature of crisis rather than the actual occurrence of defendant
bankruptcies that represents a true pathological response to mass
torts.
D.

Exhaustion of Compensation Funds

As noted above, occasional bankruptcies are an inevitable feature
of the tort system. When they occur, late-arriving claimants are often
unable to recover because the corporation's assets will have been depleted by prior judgments and dispersed in the liquidation process.
This problem of the late-arriving claimant is frequently cited as further evidence of a crisis within the tort system that mass tort litigation
created. 63 Thus, one commentator observed that such claimants may
receive less compensation (if any at all) "for no better reason than
that they were exposed later, contracted their disease later, learned of
their disease later, selected a lawyer who filed a claim later, or were
grouped by their lawyer with a batch of other claims scheduled for
later settlement." Such an outcome is characterized as "manifestly
unfair."64
Unfair indeed, but it is important to understand the source of the
unfairness. Again, much of the crisis talk in the mass torts area misses
the point. The unfairness to late-arriving claimants does not stem
from their status as mass tort plaintiffs, but instead is endemic to any
competition for scarce resources, including the competition among
claimants to a defendant's assets. If a defendant company's assets are
sufficient to cover its liabilities, then the timing of claims is irrelevant.
But limited capitalization and limited liability-key features of corpoWeinstein, supra note 4, at 472.
See Vairo, supra note 59 (arguing that the A.H. Robins bankruptcy reorganization
plan, established to cover Dalkon Shield Claims, represents a model for resolving the competing interests at play in mass tort cases).
63
See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 4, at 436; Jack B. Weinstein, A Vewfrom the Judidauy, 13
CARDOzo L. REv. 1957, 1958-59 (1992) (discussing difficulties of allocating funds between
present and future asbestos claimants).
64 Schuck, supranote 2, at 561.
61
62
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rate law-inevitably create the danger that actors will incur liabilities
in excess of their assets and thus will be unable to satisfy all claimants.
Of course, we can devise schemes to limit the horizontal inequities that result from the exhaustion of compensation funds. We
could, for example, wait for the pool of claimants to stabilize before
making distributions. 65 This, however, generates an offsetting inequity for early-arriving claimants, who may need compensation before
the full scope of liability can be determined. 66 We could create freestanding compensation funds, thus reserving resources to cover latent
injuries. But if bankruptcy is really a threat, such schemes cannot
solve the problem. Rather, they merely redistribute the pain by shortchanging early-.rriving claimants to preserve funds for subsequent
67
plaintiffs.
It is, in the end, a zero-sum game. The fundamental problem is
resource scarcity, a problem that exists whether we are discussing
mass-tort-related bankruptcies, or bank runs, or a kindergarten game
of musical chairs. Any effort to escape this fact either generates the
kind of internal trade-offs just noted or else pits tort law against other
important public policies. Specifically, while the tort system aims at
full compensation for all injured plaintiffs, both corporate and bankruptcy law establish the right of corporate actors, under some circumstances, to avoid paying all or part of their liabilities. 6 8 This right is a
key feature of our system because it serves a variety of social goals
unrelated to compensating harm: it encourages capital formation
and entrepreneurial risk-taking, improves the liquidity of equity markets, broadens the base of business ownership, and decreases the costs
of monitoring management.6 9 These benefits come at a clear cost;
when things go badly, those with a stake in the corporation-whether
they be shareholders, debtholders, employees, pensioners, suppliers,
or potential tort claimants-face the prospect, and indeed the likelihood, of an incomplete recovery. But these costs are not the product
of mass tort litigation, and they cannot be willed away by tort reform.

65
See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming
Corp.) Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala.
Apr. 1, 1994). These cases highlight the difficulty that problems of damage indeterminacy
pose for assessing proposed class action settlement of breast implant claims.
66
Indeed, reformers frequently cite delays in compensation as further evidence of
crisis. See suprapart HA
67
Schuck, supra note 2, at 577 ("The risk of defendants' insolvency will exist in any
event; the only question is which claimants must bear it.").
68 See Siliciano, supra note 51, at 1834-53.
69 Id. at 1860-63. But see H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liabilityfor Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
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III
OF REASONS AND RHETORIC

It is possible to continue dissecting the literature of crisis, but at
this point, the general theme is clear. The motivating idea behind the
crisis rhetoric-that mass tort litigation has produced pathological distortions in an otherwise swift, fair and efficient tort system-is simply
not accurate. To be sure, mass torts raise many troubling questions.
Uncompensated plaintiffs, bankrupt defendants, costly litigations, and
congested courts: these are not pleasant things to gaze upon. But
they are not the peculiar result of mass torts. Rather, mass torts simply serve as a magnifier that makes visible to us the problems and
tensions inherent in the way we live and the way that the tort system
resolves disputes.
The related problems of defendant bankruptcies and inadequate
plaintiff recoveries, for example, stem from sources completely external to tort law. As a society, we like our technology and we like it now.
We continually overlook, against all reason, the possibility that a new
invention or concoction may pose hidden or poorly understood risks.
We market and consume such products on a massive scale without
insisting that their creators and sellers be sufficiently capitalized to
guard against all potential losses. Thus when the inevitable happens
and a lurking risk appears, there are always many bodies on the
ground.
At this point, any system of redress that seeks to extract compensation from harm-causing actors will manifest symptoms of bankruptcy
and incomplete recovery.7 0 We might alter the mix somewhat by discounting plaintiff recoveries to avoid defendant insolvencies or shortchanging early claimants to protect later ones, but the pie will never
be big enough no matter how it is sliced. The ideal of full recovery
and unimpaired solvency, implicit in much of the literature of crisis, is
just not of this world.
Other troubling characteristics of mass tort litigation, such as delay, transaction costs, and failures of proof, are internal to the adjudicatory process. But within that domain, the potential for these
problems is universal rather than restricted to the mass tort area.
Again, mass tort litigation merely helps us see key features of our approach to injury compensation. If we stop blaming the messenger
and consider the message, the relevant inquiry shifts in a subtle but
important way. No longer is it a question of what kind of emergency
reform will best solve the crisis created by mass torts; instead, the issue
70 See Arthur R. Miller, Of FrankensteinMonsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "ClassAction Problem, " 92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 668 (1979) (noting that "[t]he 'big case' is

an inevitable byproduct of the mass character of contemporary American society," which
exists independent of the specific means employed to resolve mass disputes).
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becomes whether tort law in toto should be replaced by some other
71
method of injury compensation.
When we reframe the question this way and think dispassionately
about the continued utility of the tort system, the interest in radical
reform may diminish. Of course, if compensating injured parties is
the only goal we wish to pursue, then the tort system must go. It is not
hard to imagine cheaper, quicker, more consistent systems of compensation. Concededly, this is just what the critics have been saying,
but if they are truly committed to the singular goal of full compensation, their reform proposals ought to be much more radical, along the
lines of universal health insurance and comprehensive disability coverage financed by general revenues.
Yet even reformers resist this move for a variety of reasons. As a
society, we like a little responsibility with our compensation. When
one actor's wrongdoing has caused injury to another, we prefer that
the injury be redressed by the harm-causing actor rather than by the
public fisc.7 2 Alas, there lies the rub. There is no such thing as a
"little responsibility," or a "bit of causation."7 3 Once these issues are
introduced into the compensation process, it becomes an altogether
different enterprise: liability, rather than need, drives the payment
process and compensation is no longer the sole purpose of the system.
Instead, issues of corrective justice and deterrence heavily influence
the system's contours. Such changes will inevitably make the compensation process measurably more costly, slow, and uncertain. In short,
we will have built, or perhaps rebuilt, a tort system. Finetuning of
various sorts-from adjusting the liability rules to shifting burdens of
persuasion on causation questions-may marginally enhance the system's compensatory function but it will not alter the compromise nature of a responsibility-based system of compensation.
In sum, the costs, delays, and uncertainties of mass tort litigation
are not pathologies; they are instead the inevitable by-products of a
system that serves multiple, competing and important public policies.
Nor are such phenomena purely negative, for the spectacle of the system in action serves an important educational function. Slow and
costly as it is, mass tort litigation is one very public forum in which
society works out its complex and ambivalent attitudes toward technology, progress, risk, uncertainty, and responsibility. Part tragedy and
71
Some commentators have grasped the fundamental and difficult nature of the
question at issue. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 822-29 (emphasizing the overall nature of the
problems with the tort system).
72 In addition, pure social insurance schemes present their own daunting design and
administrative challenges. See id. at 827-29.
73 See id. at 826 ("Only when disability becomes a sufficient condition for reparationin other words, when a social insurance model is adopted-are the causal issues put to
rest.").
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part farce, epic in scope and expensive to produce, it is a hell of a
play, and one we may derive substantial benefits from watching.
We should at least consider the value of those benefits in debating whether other, less visible but "more efficient" means of compensating the victims of mass torts ought be adopted. In the areas of
accident law, such as automobile no-fault systems, where questions of
responsibility and causation have beenjettisoned to enhance compensation, there was little social learning left to do. Litigating car crashes
added scarce insight to the lessons of experience; the risks associated
with automobiles were so universally understood and reciprocal in nature that the question of fault held little dramatic interest.
Not so with mass torts. They emerge, more often than not, on
the frontier of knowledge and technology, and the issues they present
merit thorough consideration. After all, selling bags of liquid silicone
so that people can surgically alter their physical contours is quite an
idea, one worth a serious chat. We ought to hear from each of the
actors involved, and probably more than once. Perhaps the tort system is as good a place as any to have such a conversation. 74
In short, the central defect of the commentary invoking the rhetoric of crisis is that it asks the wrong question. Rather than debating
what has gone wrong with the tort system, the core inquiry should
focus on whether we wish to retain the system at all. This refraining of
the question is not merely a matter of semantics. Crisis talk is cheap
and dangerous; it encourages impulsive and partial solutions and diverts attention from the full nature of the problem. 75
Moreover, in the context of mass torts, there are special reasons
to regard claims of crisis with more than a modest degree of skepticism. Defendants naturally will support any reform that allows them
to escape, limit, or delay the imposition of liability for harms they have
caused. Crisis-mongering clearly furthers that end. Plaintiffs' attorneys representing large classes of existing and potential claimants also
stand to reap enormous financial benefits by working out "creative"
settlements with such defendants. Doomsaying on their part helps
convince the courts that must approve such settlements that they indeed are fair and in the public interest. Even academics and judges,
who have little opportunity to tap the huge amounts of money at
stake, may achieve professional and personal satisfaction by fashioning
and implementing bold solutions to avert disaster.
74 Indeed, in this regard, the proposed class action settlement in the silicone breast
implant cases may have occurred too early in the process of social education. There may be
considerable benefits in allowing the litigation process to proceed until such cases are
"ripe" for collective resolution. See McGovern, supranote 60 (analyzing the success ofjudicially created innovations in the context of "mature" mass torts).
75 See Siliciano, supranote 51, at 1853-63.
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This is not to say that all efforts toward private resolution or legal
innovation should be met with suspicion, but only that we will think
more clearly about the value of such solutions if we turn down the
volume. It may well be that some initial alarmism about mass torts
helped to unleash the creative energies of the common law. But as
Peter Shuck's companion article in this symposium makes clear, those
energies are now fully engaged in managing the challenges posed by
mass torts. Crisis rhetoric no longer plays a useful role. If anything,
the continued recycling of such rhetoric may propel the process of
innovation too far in the direction of oversimplification and speedy
resolution. The advent of settlement class actions certainly raises substantial concerns on this score. We will be better able to assess the
merits of such solutions if freed from the doomsaying that spawned
them.
IV
YEAH,

BUT WHAT ABOUT ASBESTOS?

If mass torts do not generally represent a pathological breakdown
of the tort system, can the same really be said about asbestos litigation? As two scholars have noted, "[a]sbestos litigation has been a
bitter pill for the American judicial system to swallow." 76 Even if delay, congestion, well-fed lawyers, disappointed claimants, and insolvent defendants are natural features of the torts landscape, their
concurrent manifestation in asbestos cases occurs on such a grand
scale that the asbestos problem might arguably qualify for special
consideration.
Perhaps, but there may be lessons to be learned in looking at the
asbestos "disaster" a little more critically. Specifically, it pays to ask
whether the real problem is as big as the numbers seem to indicate, or
whether prior errors in judgment, classification, and disposition have
served to catapult the asbestos litigation to an abnormal level of unmanageability. As previously noted,7 7 one reason asbestos may assume
"monstrous" dimensions is that courts and commentators have been
insufficiently rigorous in separating the wheat of asbestos claims from
the chaff. A critical eye can segregate strong asbestos claims from
weak ones by focusing on the potentially dispositive issues they present. The weak cases should not be allowed to free-ride on the
strength of the former, yet the tendency to think about "the asbestos
problem" encourages precisely this kind of parasitic fusion of strong
and weak cases.
76

Henderson & Twerski, supra note 56, at 1336.

77

See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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Take, for example, the problem of "unimpaired asbestos claimants." These are individuals who manifest pleural plaques or pleural
thickenings-small scale changes in the lung lining that generally
cause no discernable physical impairment but may (or may not) be
the precursor to debilitating conditions. 78 It is possible that half or
more of currently docketed asbestos cases involve plaintiffs who have
not yet suffered any actual impairment. 79
This is shocking, and raises the obvious question of what such
cases are doing in the courts in the first place? The state of "being
impaired," of suffering actual damages, is a fundamental prerequisite
for tort recovery. Courts should have exercised a vigorous gatekeeper
function, summarily excluding such cases from the tort system. Yet,
perhaps anticipating the impact of statutes of limitation and the single
judgment rule on these claims should harm materialize in the future,8 0 or perhaps bewitched by the idea of recovery for the mere fear
of future illness,8 1 courts left the gate open and the caseloads surged.
Indeed, from the individual plaintiffs perspective, filing was a sensible
move; why endure the risks suffered by late-arriving claimants when
you can get in line now?
But surely there was another way to go. Statutes of limitation and
the singlejudgment rule are malleable enough that courts could have
easily preserved the rights of asbestos litigants to bring suit in the future without needing to hear from them now. While deferral registries are a sensible idea for handling the mess we have, 82 it is
important to realize that the problem might have been avoided altogether by a more hard-hearted and rigorous up-front scrutiny. Applying the same critical attitude to the issues of fault and causation might
similarly serve to thin the claimants class. If we are going to stick with
a responsibility-based compensation system, such a critical approach is
essential to controlling dockets and ensuring that the limited funds
available for compensation are distributed to the most "worthy" claimants, at least in a legal sense.
In sum, the unmanageability of the asbestos cases may stem not
from a failure of the tort system, but from a failure to observe the
ground rules of that system. To guard against "the next asbestos,"
courts must honor those rules. This is not an easy task, for it means
78
79

Schuck, supra note 2, at 544-48.
Id. at 549 n.36.
80 "Cancerphobia" claims are a dangerous creature regardless of setting, but are particularly disruptive in the mass tort context. Courts should have kept a tight rein on such
exotica.
81 Schuck, supra note 2, at 575. Some courts held the line. See, e.g., Giffear v. JohnsManville Corp., 632 A.2d 880, 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appealgranted, 651 A.2d 539 (Pa.
1994).

82

See Schuck, supra note 2.
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denying recovery to large numbers of claimants simply because their
causation hypotheses are as yet unprovable or because they had the
"bad luck" of not yet suffering any impairment. But if compensation
truly depends upon a legally sufficient showing of responsibility for
harm caused, such claimants must be denied.
What if, despite a renewed commitment to careful gatekeeping,
the number of asbestos cases keeps growing? It has been estimated
that over twenty-one million American workers were significantly exposed to asbestos.83 If that crowd shows up, we are in big trouble. But
in some sense, the course would be clear. We will be faced with a
situation that transcends our remedial powers, regardless of whether
the tort system or some other means of compensation is employed. At
some point, harms become so widespread that they defy any effort to
think in terms of responsibility and causation.84 When that threshold
is reached, when the sheer mass of the claims defeats their characterization as torts, the options are limited. We can devise distracting
schemes to move money from one pocket to another. Or we can accept such losses as part of the background risk that characterizes modem life. But rectification lies forever beyond our reach.
CONCLUSION

The "crisis" of mass torts may, in the end, be a crisis of faith. Unlike the obscure dramas of "everyday" torts, the lessons learned from
mass torts are big and ugly and hard to ignore. They threaten our
faith in our ability to harness technology as well as our faith in the
capacity of the legal system to make things right should that technology rise up and betray us. This is all for the good, for some searching
doubt on both scores was probably long overdue. Our time in the desert will have been well spent if we return more humble and more
realistic about some basic truths.
Crisis talk inhibits this needed reckoning by suggesting both that
things are worse than they really are and that they can be made better
than is probably possible. By viewing the tort system's delays, costs,
and insolvencies as symptoms of illness, such talk bewitches us with
the vision of a free and frictionless system of accident compensation.
Once we accept, however, that such conditions are to a significant degree inherent in any responsibility-based system of compensation, it
becomes possible to think more clearly about the wisdom of retaining
such a system. When the alternatives are considered, we may ultimately conclude that the tort system's approach to accident compensation makes the best of a bad situation.
SeeJackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1985).
Consider, for example, mass tort litigation seeking recovery for the harms caused
by smoking, or alcohol consumption, or the hole in the ozone layer.
83
84
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It is important to realize, however, that we may not find the "best"
to be very good. There may be ways to improve marginally the system's fairness and efficiency, but the tort system will never be transformed into an enterprise that is quick and cheap, with happy faces all
around. It is not in the nature of the beast.

